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29 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
SUBJECT : OSR -- The First 90 Days

At the end of the first three months, a short report on OSR is in order.

Production...

The Office has been busy. These have been the months for final preparation of our contributions to the major Soviet military estimates. The contributions to 11-3, 11-14, and 11-8 have been submitted, and OSR persons are continuing to work closely with the ONE staff on the drafting. One OSR person -- either a division chief or a branch chief -- is responsible for representing the Office, and in effect the Deputy Director for Intelligence, at all meetings with the Board and the representatives. [REDACTED] is our man on 11-8, [REDACTED] on 11-3, and [REDACTED] on 11-14.

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
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In addition to the basic contribution, we have in the case of 11-8 and 11-3 prepared supplementary material which costs the forces we have projected. [REDACTED] and the Cost Analysis Branch take the figures prepared in the Forces Division and work out the cost implications.

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The work on the estimate contributions has not prevented other publication. OSR has produced 15 Intelligence Memorandums, including one jointly with OSI and one with OCI. We have also produced one Intelligence Report giving the results of our detailed assessment, undertaken with handsome IAS assistance, of equipment levels in the Belorussian Military Districts. Other Intelligence Reports are nearing completion.

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Working with OCI, OSI, and FMSAC to assure that the needs of the PDB, CIB, and the Weekly are met is the responsibility of [REDACTED] and the Regional Analysis Division. In the first 90 days, OSR prepared about 70 CIB articles and notes, 30 articles for the CIWR, including several Special Reports. In addition, OSR contributes almost daily to the Vietnam and China reporting of OCI.

...and the Producers...

OSR came into being with its T/O full and, in fact, slightly overflowing. We are monitoring this carefully to make sure that we do not become over-committed. One problem right now is distribution: we are a few persons over in the professional category, and a few under in the clerical category.

The OSR staff is by and large a young one with a substantial portion of the professionals made up of persons in Grades GS-12 and below who have been in the Agency less than five years. This means there is a constant problem of in-training for most of the branch chiefs. This also means that in the crunch situations, when deadlines are short and quality needs are high, a disproportionately small number of persons carries the load in OSR. This will improve with time.

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When the [REDACTED] report is written, I hope there will be some small acknowledgement of the generous contribution made by OSR. Not only did this Office make available full time one Division Chief (and a very valuable and hard-to-replace one, at that), but it also manfully assumed the duties of the CIA Member on COMIREX. This job is one of great interest to me and to OSR, but it takes about 30-40 percent of [REDACTED] time each week. This is not an inconsiderable price to pay, particularly at the stage in the development of the Office. We are all agreed, however, that the COMIREX account is so important -- to the Office, to the DDI, and to the Agency -- that it is well worth it.

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...And where they produce

I wouldn't want to disappoint [REDACTED] by not saying something about space in this report.

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A thorough and systematic reexamination of the space needs and allocations of the components in the Special Center is underway. I can't urge too strongly its prompt completion and implementation. The situation in OSR may be no worse than that existing among other Special Center offices, but I'm sure it is no better. For example, the Offensive Missiles Branch has to pack 14 persons in 800 square feet of office space, or per person allocation of 57 square feet. Several other branches have per person figures in the 60s and 70s.

A Washington Post editorial this morning notes the idea of one sociologist that each person needs a "space bubble" around him of a certain minimum size and inviolability. If the bubble becomes too badly bruised or intruded upon, or if it gets taken away, the person's estimate of himself suffers, his ability to function effectively drops, and his resentment builds up. I would only comment that there are some pretty tight space bubbles behind the barrier, in OSR and elsewhere.

Another problem caused by the present space situation is the effect of dispersion on efficient management. There are OSR units on five floors in this building, on both sides of the barrier, and in [REDACTED]. This arrangement greatly inhibits our efforts to knit these units together as a single office with common concerns, common objectives, and a common interest in achieving a unified OSR viewpoint in our diverse production areas. At the same time that we improve the person allocation, I hope we can bring the OSR components into the same general area.

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And in conclusion

I think we are moving forward to the accomplishment of what you had in mind when you decided to

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establish the Office of Strategic Research. I have not dwelt in this report on our relations with others, in this Agency, in the Pentagon, and elsewhere, but I believe they are generally good and improving.

Throughout this period, [REDACTED] has been a source of strength and wise counsel. I think we've got something good going here and I hope you think so too.

BRUCE C. CLARKE, Jr.  
Director  
Strategic Research

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